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This study analyses the relations between the noteworthy perfor-
mance of Chilean exports over the last two decades and the high
economic growth rate of the country since the mid-1980s. It con-
cludes that the Chilean experience may be described as a case of
“export-led growth” rather than one of “growth-led exports”.
What were the causes of Chile’s export success? Trade liberaliza-
tion acted as an important stimulus, but this success was also due
to other policies, both horizontal and sectoral: the exchange-rate
policy followed since 1982, the introduction of drawback ar-
rangements and export subsidies for exports of relatively minor
importance in the mid-1980s, the use of a debt conversion
programme to stimulate new production activities for the export
of specific goods after the debt crisis, the active participation of
the State in providing market information, and the substantial
subsidies provided for the forestry sector. The next stage in the
development of Chilean exports will be more difficult, however,
and will call for more complex policies than the previous stage.
Among the issues that must be addressed by such policies are the
solution of market flaws in key activities (training and education,
technical and marketing know-how, and the provision of
long-term resources for investments in new activities not previ-
ously undertaken).






Rightly or wrongly, Chile has come to be perceived
in academic and policy-making circles as a shining
example of the success that awaits countries bold
enough to introduce and persevere with reforms to
favour the market forces. In the period from 1974 to
1979, the military government which overthrew
President Allende in 1973 embarked on an out and
out process of trade liberalization, freed domestic fi-
nancial markets and opened up the balance of pay-
ments capital account (see Meller, 1996, chap. 3;
Ffrench-Davis, Leiva and Madrid, 1993; Agosin and
Ffrench-Davis, 1995). The aim of these reforms was
to ring down the curtain on the import substitution
industrialization model, which had been the main de-
velopment paradigm ever since the 1940s and had
been kept in being by governments of the most di-
verse tendencies. The reforms of the 1974-1979 pe-
riod were guided by the idea that once the full sway
of the market forces had been assured, resources
would be reallocated (without cost) to the export in-
dustries in which the country had comparative ad-
vantages, thus leading to rapid growth not only of
exports but also of the overall product.
Consequently, in any evaluation of the Chilean
policy reforms it is particularly interesting to study
the behaviour of exports and the way they relate to
the overall growth of the economy. There is no deny-
ing that exports grew rapidly after 1974 and have
continued to grow up to the present. Thus, it is main-
tained that one of the prime elements explaining
Chile’s success has been the exceptionally good per-
formance of exports. However, although the process
of expansion and diversification of exports has been
very successful, it has only been a driving force for
the rest of the economy in recent years. Up to the end
of the 1980s, the vigorous growth of exports was not
backed up by a significant rise in the investment rate
or a concomitant improvement in the overall eco-
nomic results. On the contrary, economic growth
during the period of the military regime was much
slower than during the 1960s, and rates of saving and
investment fell off markedly. At the same time, the
process of export-based growth is relatively recent,
and its long-term sustainability remains an open
question.
This article analyses the evolution of exports and
the overall product over a lengthy period: 1960-1995.
It seeks to identify the main trends in the growth of
exports and to assign their due responsibility to the
various factors that affect export behaviour, provid-
ing answers to the following questions:
• Was trade liberalization responsible for the obvi-
ous success in export activities that Chile has
had since the mid-1970s and continues to have
today?
• What importance should be assigned to other
government policies that promoted exports in
general and to selective policies at the sectoral
level?
• Why has the connection between export growth
and overall economic performance been much
stronger in the 1990s than before?
• What are the prospects for export-led growth in
the coming decades?
This study has been organized along the follow-
ing lines: after the present Introduction, section II
asks whether the Chilean experience can best be de-
scribed as an example of “export-led growth” or of
“growth-led exports”. In the case of Chile, it is dem-
onstrated that the view that growth was led by ex-
ports is more in line with the facts than the opposite
view. Since the mid-1980s, export growth and in-
creased investment have been the motive forces be-
hind the growth of the Chilean economy.
Section III analyses the causes of the expansion
and diversification of exports: particularly the link
between trade liberalization and exchange policy.
Although it was successful in stimulating an increase
in exports after a long period of lagging growth,
the 1974-1979 trade liberalization process was
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needlessly costly, because a large part of the in-
stalled manufacturing capacity was destroyed in-
stead of being gradually reoriented towards the
export sector. Although there is no factually verifi-
able theory for evaluating the degree of success of
reforms, it is suggested that a different set of poli-
cies (with a more devalued exchange rate and
lower real interest rates) would have helped the ad-
aptation of the manufacturing sector and ultimately
proved more efficient.
Section IV looks at other policies that affected
exports and at sectoral-level policies and factors.
The analysis shows that one must not overlook other
policies and initial conditions which subsequently
strengthened the response of supply and were very
important for explaining the export success at the
sectoral level.
Finally, section V sums up the results of the
study and gives a general overview of the policy req-
uisites for ensuring the sustainability of the ex-
port-oriented model that Chile has been applying for
more than two decades. We maintain that the “easy”
export promotion stage is already over. So far, apart
from a few concrete interventions which did indeed
have a very important effect in terms of export
growth, as we shall see below, the main role of the
State has been to dismantle the system of incentives
that were in force during the import substitution pe-
riod (from 1938 to 1973). The next stage in export
development will involve diversification into more
highly processed goods and services and will pose
much more complex policy demands. Greater link-
ages between the private and public sectors will also
be essential.
II
The Chilean experience: export-led growth
or growth-led exports?
Does the Chilean experience fit in with the theory
that exports have been the leading sector in the econ-
omy and that export growth has been the motive
force responsible for the high growth rates achieved
since the mid-1980s? Or has it instead been the rapid
growth of the product which has been the main fac-
tor in the expansion of exports? The first of these
views highlights the role of exports in promoting
overall growth. In contrast, the supporters of the idea
of growth-led exports emphasize the importance of
capital accumulation and the effort to build up na-
tional technological capacity as necessary prior con-
ditions for the export boom.1
Most economic development theories make no
distinction between exports and non-exportable pro-
duction. In almost all economic growth models,
whether they be of a neoclassical character (Solow,
1956), inspired by the ideas of Keynes (Pasinetti,
1974), or based on the “endogenous growth” ap-
proach (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), the funda-
mental variables explaining economic growth are the
rate of investment and technological progress. Those
which assign a key role to exports run into difficul-
ties because they face an identification problem: as
exports are part of GDP (and often quite a large part),
rapid increases in exports automatically have an im-
pact on the GDP growth rate although there is no
clear causal relation to explain this.
Is there something special about exports, how-
ever? This is our hypothesis here. In a small,
late-industrializing economy, the growth and diversi-
fication of exports are important for two reasons.
First, the domestic market is small and cannot sup-
port sustained GDP growth on the demand side. Any
economic development impulse based on the expan-
sion of domestic demand is bound to be exhausted
quite quickly. In contrast, export markets are (al-
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1 Rodrik (1995) and Akyüz and Gore (1996) attach great impor-
tance to the increase in the rate of investment as the fundamen-
tal cause of the high growth rates of South Korea and Taiwan. In
the opinion of these authors, the rise in the rate of investment is
of itself sufficient to explain the high export growth rates of
these two economies, without any need to bring trade policies
into the picture. On the basis of these analyses, one may never-
theless wonder whether the very marked increases in investment
would have taken place if there had not been active trade poli-
cies which made the export of new products highly profitable.
most) limitless for a small country and hence do not
involve any growth restrictions on the demand side.2
If the incentives offered have an anti-export bias,
however, the expectations of rapid growth will not
be fulfilled. Second, as small developing countries
do not produce machinery, technological change co-
mes largely from abroad, mainly in the form of im-
ported capital goods. Although such imports can be
financed for a time with capital inflows, the
sustainability of high economic growth rates nor-
mally requires vigorous export promotion. The ex-
pansion of exports thus provides the basis for general
economic development, with the stability of this pro-
cess being assured through diversification of ex-
ports.3
Whichever may be correct, each of these two
mutually exclusive concepts has policy implications.
If the accumulation of physical and human capital
and technical change are key factors for growth,
there would be no need to embark on export promo-
tion policies. If, on the other hand, the facts confirm
that the export-led growth paradigm is correct, then
in order to achieve economic development it would
be necessary to encourage an increase in the amount
and diversification of exports. It would be important
to support the growth process with horizontal poli-
cies to correct market failures that impede the diver-
sification of exports, and also, as the developing
countries are far behind their technological frontier,
policies would be needed to support incipient export
sectors.
1. Exports and GDP growth, 1960-1995
The broad lines of the Chilean economic growth pro-
cess may be better understood if we divide the period
as from 1960 into five sub-periods: i) 1960-1970,
marked by import substitution and the preponderance
of copper, which accounted for 80% of export in-
come; ii) 1971-1973, which corresponds to the So-
cialist experiment; iii) 1974-1981, when the military
government introduced market-friendly reforms that
had an impact on trade; iv) 1982-1989, marked by
somewhat greater pragmatism in policy formulation,
and v) the period from 1990 on, after the return to
democracy.
Since 1974, export growth has run ahead of GDP
growth (table 1 and figure 1). Only since 1989, how-
ever, has the growth of non-traditional exports been
accompanied by strong and sustained growth of the
GDP and a rise in the rate of investment. In
1974-1989 the gross domestic product not only grew
less than exports, but also rates of growth and invest-
ment were far below those reached in the 1960s.
Nevertheless, the degree of openness of the
Chilean economy has increased significantly since
1974. In 1970 exports of goods and services repre-
sented nearly 15% of GDP (at current prices), but by
1995 this proportion had risen to 29%. In a sense, it
could be said that one of the objectives of trade liber-
alization policies has been achieved: the economy
has evolved from a situation in which its centre of
gravity consisted of the non-tradeable or importable
sectors to another in which that centre is made up of
the export sectors. In this process, whole areas of the
manufacturing sector (such as textiles and the metal
products and machinery sector) virtually disap-
peared, but others later emerged, oriented mainly to-
wards external markets.
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2 Provided, of course, that their shares in the markets of the im-
porting countries do not become too large. In other words, in or-
der for the export-led growth to be sustained on the demand
side, the exporting country must continue to be “small” in world
markets. This requires ongoing diversification of exports.
3 Diversification of exports can also be advisable for other rea-
sons. As an economy rises up the “technological ladder” with
export diversification, this can also raise real wages, thus fur-
ther stimulating growth and improving income distribution. This
has by no means been the case in the Chilean economy in the
last two decades, however. Although exports have been diversi-
fied, with very few exceptions their technological content con-
tinues to be unsophisticated and wages continue to be much
lower than in the advanced industrialized countries.
TABLE 1





GDP investmenta Totalb Excluding
copper
1960-1970 4.2 25.1 5.6 4.6
1971-1973 0.5 16.9 -4.4 -11.9
1974-1981 3.7 22.2 12.0 20.9
1982-1989 2.4 19.8 6.5 8.2
1990-1995 6.7 28.5 9.0 9.8
Source: Calculations by the author, based on Central Bank of
Chile, 1989 and various other years.
a As a percentage of GDP at constant 1986 prices.
b Only goods.
Since 1974 the growth of exports has been very
rapid and that of non-mineral exports has been quite
spectacular. For the purposes of our analysis, exports
of goods have been divided into seven categories:
copper, other minerals, agricultural products (mainly
fresh fruit and vegetables), fishmeal and fishery
products, wood and wood products (including a
small but growing furniture sector), paper and pulp
(especially pulp), and other manufactures. This latter
category covers nearly 3,000 articles of the most var-
ied types. It includes, among many other things, con-
fectionery, fruit juices, prepared foodstuffs, canned
and frozen fish, industrially-reared salmon, wine,
auto parts, sanitary equipment and metal products.
All these goods are marked by intensive use of natu-
ral resources or the application of conventional stan-
dardized technology. Their main markets are in other
Latin American countries, but they form an increas-
ingly large proportion of Chile’s exports to the
United States and Europe.
Exports of non-factor services have also risen
dramatically. It has not been possible to disaggregate
exports of services by category, but the qualitative in-
formation available indicates that some new services
industries have begun to export their products suc-
cessfully in recent years (computer programmes and
engineering services, for example). These are sectors
in which the country has been able to acquire com-
parative advantages through long-term human re-
sources development policies, which, it may be
noted in passing, suffered serious setbacks during the
military regime.
Thus, exports have not only grown, but have be-
come increasingly diversified. In 1971-1973 copper
represented almost 80% of total exports of goods,
and if other minerals are added, the share of minerals
as a whole came to almost 90%. In the first half of
the 1990s, in contrast, the share of copper went down
to 40% and that of minerals as a whole to less than
50%.4 On the other hand, the share of “other manu-
factures” rose from 5% in 1971-1973 to almost 30%
in the first half of the 1990s. If we add paper and
pulp, fishmeal and wood products, total exports of
manufactures account for over 40% of total exports
in the most recent period, compared with only 10%
in 1971-1973.
For each of these seven categories of products,
we estimated price indexes from which we can de-
rive growth rates of export volumes by category.5
The volumes of non-mineral products exported have
grown rapidly since 1974 (table 2). The growth rates
of export volumes were particularly impressive dur-
ing the early years of the military regime
(1974-1981), but this was due above all to their low
initial levels (which were also depressed in the case
of manufactures) in 1973.
The growth of exports of “other manufactures”
–which include articles produced both for export and
for the domestic market– in this period was largely
due to the enormous excess capacity caused by the
trade liberalization policies applied. The adjustment
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FIGURE 1
Chile: Non-mineral exports and GDP
growth, 1960-1994
(Exports in millions of 1995 dollars; GDP in millions of 1988
dollars)
Source: Calculations by the author, based on Central Bank of
Chile, 1989, and various other years.
4 However, the big investments made by foreign copper compa-
nies in the 1980s may reverse these trends in the years to come,
when the activities generated by these investments come on
stream.
5 The official Chilean statistics do not include long chronologi-
cal series on export volumes and prices. For the period between
1960 and 1989 we used the export price indexes calculated by
Sáez (1991) as deflators of the price statistics. For the period
from 1990 to 1995 there are Central Bank estimates for export
prices and volumes. Unfortunately, there are no data for 1990 it-
self which would allow the two sets of data to be matched. The
price indexes for 1990 were therefore calculated with the data of
Sáez (1991), using an autoregressive scheme with seven lags.
Since both the manufacturing price indexes of Sáez and those of
the Central Bank included paper and pulp, fishmeal and wood
products, and as we wanted to estimate global prices and vol-
umes with the exclusion of those products, we proceeded to cal-
culate our own index of manufactured export prices and
constructed a price index for these three articles using mobile
annual averages. In spite of the fragility of the price series, the
volume series obtained in this way behaves reasonably well.
made in order to reduce a fiscal deficit which had
grown to the equivalent of almost 20% of GDP, to-
gether with the very high interest rates prevailing
(which were not only due to tight monetary policies
but also to financial liberalization with little or no
control over the banks), contributed to the depression
of global demand and the contraction of GDP in
1975 by almost 13%. One means of defence open
to domestic producers was to seek external markets
for the goods they could not sell at home
(Ffrench-Davis, 1979). The manufacturing sector
contracted in absolute terms, its output did not
recover its 1972 level until 1987 (figure 2), and the
share of manufactures in GDP fell from 26.6% in
1972 to 20.8% in 1987.6
The excess of production capacity was also a
factor in the growth of exports of manufactures in the
period from 1982 to 1989. There was a further severe
economic contraction in 1982-1983, when GDP fell
by nearly 15%. Only after 1985 could one speak of
export-led growth and positive net investment in
this sector. Consequently, export-led growth only
became firmly established from the mid-1980s.
Non-traditional exports have become the most dy-
namic component in the economy, rates of invest-
ment have risen from typical Latin American levels
to those of East Asia, and the growth rate of the
economy as a whole has been high and sustained.
Since 1989, the real product has been close to the po-
tential product and the excess of production capacity
in manufacturing (and in the economy as a whole)
has been close to zero, so that this latter factor can-
not be the explanation for the increase in exports of
manufactures. For these reasons, exports became one
of the motive forces for growth with the recovery
from the debt crisis; in previous years the excess of
production capacity had prevented them from carry-
ing the rest of the economy with them.
2. Evolution of growth and exports from 1960
to 1995: an analysis of time series
In order to answer the main question posed at the be-
ginning of this section we constructed an
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TABLE 2
Chile: Annual average growth rates of export volumes,
by types of goods, 1960-1995
(Percentages)
1960-1970 1971-1973 1974-1981 1982-1989 1990-1995
Copper 6.2 -1.0 7.8 4.6 7.8
Other minerals 1.6 -2.6 6.7 6.5 3.4
Agricultural products 2.4 -27.5 32.6 11.8 7.0
Fishmeal and fishery products 18.7 -31.1 45.8 11.1 3.0
Wood and wood products 15.9 -25.1 41.0 7.3 4.3
Pulp and paper 16.7 -7.6 18.5 0.8 22.7
Other manufactures 7.1 -28.0 38.6 9.2 12.7
Total non-copper 4.6 -11.9 20.9 8.2 9.8
Total goods 5.6 -4.4 12.0 6.5 9.0
Services ... ... 18.8a 0.1 8.0
Source: Calculations by the author, based on unpublished data of the Central Bank of Chile and on Sáez (1991).
a 1976-1981.
6 Data from Central Bank of Chile (1989). The proportions
mentioned in the text were calculated with data at constant 1977
prices.
FIGURE 2
Chile: Real manufacturing product, 1960-1995
(Millions of 1995 pesos)
Source: Calculations by the author based on Central Bank of
Chile, 1989 and various other years.
autoregressive vectors model, using Johansen’s esti-
mation technique.7 This is fully justified because in a
system which simultaneously determines GDP and
exports we do not know which variable is exogenous
and which is endogenous. In reality, the aim of the
exercise is to determine the direction of causality be-
tween exports and GDP. In the system, it is assumed











where Y is GDP, K is the capital stock, X is real ex-
ports and t is a trend over time. This system contains
an equation in which GDP is a function of the inputs
of capital and exports (which may be interpreted as a
production function in which exports represent in-
creases in productivity associated with the inputs of
capital). The solution of the system naturally in-
cludes the possibility that there may be more than
one direction of causality. The production function
we want to estimate is the following:
Y
t
= α0 + α1 Kt + α2 Xt + α3t + ut (2)
where u is a well-behaved error term. It is easy to
demonstrate (see Appendix 1) that, as the capital
stock is the sum of net investment, equation (3) can
be transformed into an equation in which the capital
stock is replaced by investment (I). This gives us the




= β0 + β1 It + β2 Xt + β3t + ut (3)
In the econometric analysis, the proxy used for
investment is gross fixed capital formation. As the
only long series for export volumes that it was possi-
ble to obtain with the available data was for exports
of goods, this is the series that was used. In the sys-
tem, all the values are expressed as natural loga-
rithms. All the variables used in the exercise have
unit roots (see the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics
in table 3). A dummy impulse variable was added for
1982 (d82) in order to take account of the largely un-
explained drop in GDP in that year. The estimated
system contains the following equation for GDP:
ln Yt = γ0 + γ1 ln It + γ2 ln Xt + γ3t + γ4 d82 + ut" (4)
where Y = GDP, I = gross fixed investment, and X =
volume of exports of goods.
A two-year lag was used for all the variables be-
cause this was determined to be the optimal lag ac-
cording to the criteria of Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn. The criteria of the Bigen maximum values
and of the trace values of the stochastic matrix
revealed that the system contains only one
cointegration vector. Tests were carried out for the
weak exogeneity hypothesis and for the zero-value
null hypothesis of the coefficients of the long-term
equilibrium production function. The results of these
tests showed that short-term imbalances in GDP
(reflected in the error correction variable obtained
in the long-term equilibrium GDP equation) affect
short-term movements of GDP but do not affect
short-term movements of gross fixed capital forma-
tion or exports. In fact, it was not possible to obtain
reasonable short-term equations for gross fixed in-
vestment or for exports. In other words, GDP is en-
dogenous and fixed investment and exports are
weakly exogenous in the system. The hypothesis
tests for the coefficients of the production function
reject the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of
fixed investment and exports are zero (at the 1%
level) but do not reject the zero-coefficient hypothe-
sis for the time trend. Thus, the final long-term equi-
librium production function obtained was:
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statigraph a of lags and trend
ln Y -0.985 0 Yes
ln I -1.067 0 Yes
ln X -2.498 0 Yes
ln M -3.982b 1 Yes
ln TR -3.506c 3 Yes
ln PM -3.406b 1 Constant
ln EX -3.297b 1 Constant
d ln Y -4.316d 0 Constant
d ln I -4.307d 0 Constant
d ln X -5.777d 0 Constant
a Augmented Dickey-Fuller statigraph.
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
c Significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
d Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
7 Figueroa and Letelier (1994) obtained very similar results us-
ing quarterly data for the 1979-1993 period.
ln Y = 0.373 * ln I + 0.324 * ln X (5)
As we have seen, exports and investment are
highly significant variables which explain the behav-
iour of the long-term equilibrium GDP. The elastici-
ties obtained indicate that, in the long term, an
increase of 3% in exports or investment is reflected
grosso modo in 1% growth of GDP. The error correc-
tion equation corresponding to equation (5), which
shows the short-term trajectory of GDP towards its
long-term equilibrium, is shown in table 4 in its
stripped-down version (i.e., after eliminating
non-significant variables). This equation has good
diagnostic properties and shows that imbalances in
GDP, as reflected by the deviations of GDP from its
long-term trajectory (ECM
t-1), affect the short-term
behaviour of GDP. Almost 40% of the GDP imbalance
is corrected within one year, while 90% of the imbal-
ance disappears in five years.
In short, exports have been one of the main
causal factors of Chile’s economic growth. Increases
in the rate of investment have also been important.
Both investment and exports are apparently exoge-
nous: i.e., increases in exports did not affect invest-
ment but they did affect GDP. Increases in GDP,
however, did not have an appreciable impact on ex-
ports or investment.
III
Trade liberalization, the exchange rate
and domestic finances
1. The analytical framework
a) Exchange rate management and trade liberaliza-
tion
The central idea in our analysis is that in order
to promote export-led growth it is necessary not only
that there should be well-designed policies for trade
liberalization and for supporting the basic macroeco-
nomic variables (exchange rate and interest rates) but
also that measures should be taken to do away with
barriers that inhibit a strong response by supply to
price signals. Such barriers are not eliminated auto-
matically by the market forces but require more spe-
cific policies by governments or other institutions
which can ensure the internalization of externalities
or the correction of market failures which prevent an
adequate response by exportable supply.
The aim of trade liberalization is to change mar-
ket signals that favour sectors producing goods that
compete with imports or non-tradeable goods and in-
stead encourage the production of exportable goods
and of import substitutes that do not require high lev-
els of protection in order to be profitable. The mea-
sures recommended by conventional trade policy
(which always advocates liberalization, without tak-
ing account of the institutional framework of the
country concerned) are generally based on a simple
trade model with only two sectors –one exportable
and the other importable– with no non-tradeable sec-
tor. In such a model it is possible to ignore the ex-
change rate, since it disappears from relative prices.
In the real world, however, non-tradeables are an im-
portant part of the economy, and moreover there are
many types of tradeables and different levels of pro-
tection for importable goods. Likewise, there is a
whole variety of potentially exportable goods, rang-
ing from those with lower average costs to those
with higher costs.
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TABLE 4
Stripped vectorial error correction model a
(Dependent variable: d ln Y(t))
Variable Coefficient t statistic t probability
Constant 2.742 4.48 0.0001
d ln Y(t-1) 0.249 1.67 0.1070
d ln I(t) 0.240 5.47 0.0000
d ln I(t-1) -0.136 -2.35 0.0270
d ln X(t-1) -0.121 -2.01 0.0560
d82 -0.098 -2.68 0.0130
ECM(t-1) -0.376 -4.43 0.0002
a ECM is the error of equation (5). Diagnosis statistics: AR(1) =
0.567 [0.575]; Chi squared (normality) = 1.666 [0.435]; ARCH 1
= 0.001 [0.982]; Xi squared = 0.790 [0.648].
Other conditions being equal, the real exchange
rate should undergo devaluation as a result of the lib-
eralization of imports; consequently, those sectors
which initially had levels of effective protection
lower than the real devaluation brought about by the
reduction in import barriers will benefit from the set
of trade liberalization and exchange rate devaluation
measures. Thus, it cannot be considered that they
were inefficient, and hence worthy of disappearing
from the economy, simply because before the liberal-
ization of imports they enjoyed a higher rate of effec-
tive protection than after the liberalization process.
Moreover, devaluation will generate new exports, al-
beit with some delay, as the economy begins to oc-
cupy a lower place in the list of potential exporters
rated by costs. Indeed, some of these new exports
may even come from sectors that previously enjoyed
higher rates of protection than after liberalization.
It can be shown that the compensatory devalua-
tion8 that should occur as a result of trade liberaliza-









where e is the exchange rate, t is the average tariff, a
circumflex over a variable indicates percentage
change, εx and εm are the (average) export and im-
port price elasticities, and h is the ratio of the values
of exports and imports at the beginning of the tariff
reduction programme. In the case of Chile, the aver-
age tariff went down from 94% in 1973 to 10% in
1979, which represented an induced decline of 43%
in import prices. If we assume a price-elasticity of
export supply of 0.5, a price-elasticity of import de-
mand of unity (less) and a balanced current account
(there were no capital flows in 1974), the compensa-
tory devaluation should have been 29%. This means
that any importable good with an initial tariff of up
to 29% was in fact internationally competitive, and
with a final tariff of 10% it should have been able to
compete with imports and become exportable.
b) Ensuring a vigorous response by supply
Even though the price signals may be favourable
for exports, there are, as we already noted, substan-
tial restrictions inhibiting a rapid and powerful re-
sponse by supply. Some of them are connected with
information. Local producers do not have adequate
information on: i) technologies that would enable
them to produce goods or services that they could
sell on foreign markets or that could help them to
compete with foreign producers on the domestic
market; ii) distribution and marketing channels on
external markets; and iii) consumer tastes and pro-
duction requirements on potential markets. The suc-
cessful countries, such as those of East Asia, have
been able to overcome these problems (see Lall,
1994). The special features of information are its
high cost and the fact that it is a public good: on the
one hand, it is a non-rival consumer good, in the
sense that its consumption by one agent does not re-
duce its value for another, and on the other hand it is
non-exclusive, that is to say, it is hard for individual
agents to prevent others from using it.9 Economic
policies relating to this issue therefore have an im-
portant role to play in the process of successfully
opening up the economy. They include: i) subsidies
for the collection of information on technologies, ex-
ternal markets and foreign tastes; ii) subsidies for
building up a reputation for local producers (what
has been called “creating a country image” in recent
years), and iii) helping existing firms to restructure
their operations, orienting them towards external
markets and becoming more capable of competing
with foreign products on the domestic market.
A less direct way of dealing with this type of ob-
vious externality, which makes use of the market, is
to create institutions or enterprises to internalize it.
For example, exporters’ associations might find it
worth collecting information on markets or technolo-
gies on behalf of their members. If this kind of solu-
tion is selected, the government’s role could be
limited to promoting the formation of such associa-
tions.
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8 In this study we have followed the Latin American convention
of expressing the exchange rate as the number of units of local
currency per unit of foreign currency. Consequently, devalua-
tion represents an increase and appreciation a decrease in the
exchange rate.
9 These features of information tend to be ignored in standard
trade theory and in conventional trade policy recommendations,
which assume that all the relevant information is available with-
out cost to all the agents. The consequence of making this as-
sumption more flexible would be to make trade liberalization
more costly, since the agents would be less capable of reallocat-
ing resources to export-oriented activities. It is therefore essen-
tial to adopt supplementary policies to ensure a strong and
timely response by supply to changes in the price signals.
In most developing countries, the capital mar-
kets are shallow or non-existent. As noted in the
abundant literature on this subject (see, for example,
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), there are serious problems
of asymmetry of information which cause flaws in
capital markets in all parts of the world, and in devel-
oping countries these flaws are further magnified
(Stiglitz, 1994). The supply-side response is dulled
and inhibited if potential entrepreneurs do not have
sufficient access to long-term finance for their invest-
ment projects. Consequently, policies to deepen do-
mestic financial markets and improve their operation
(through greater regulation and transparency, for ex-
ample) are an important complement to trade liberal-
ization. Indeed, such policies will probably not be
enough: the formal financial markets, no matter how
developed they are, tend to discriminate against
small producers and firms which do not have an es-
tablished reputation or lack collateral. It will there-
fore be necessary to supplement the private financial
markets with suitable public action.
Other bottlenecks on the supply side are con-
nected with the low levels of human capital forma-
tion and the lack of suitable infrastructure. Public
policies are indispensable in these areas, too. Educa-
tion and training have strong externalities, so the pri-
vate market will tend to neglect them. Indeed, human
capital formation is an investment for which there is
practically no private finance. The planning, design
and –despite the current fashion– construction of in-
frastructure continue to be priority tasks for govern-
ments in their efforts to improve supply responses.
If this view of the situation is valid, then trade
liberalization takes on a more limited (although nev-
ertheless important) role in the promotion of an ex-
port-oriented growth process. Trade liberalization is
a means of changing the relative prices of an econ-
omy and making it more likely that producers will
allocate resources to activities where the country has
current comparative advantages. As it does abso-
lutely nothing to try to correct market flaws associ-
ated with the factors mentioned above, however, it is
rather a clumsy tool for encouraging producers to
create new comparative advantages. Indeed, some
countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have
promoted highly successful processes of ex-
port-oriented growth without liberalizing their trade
(Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1993 and 1994; Rodrik,
1995). In Chile, in spite of its much-vaunted
free-market approach, there have been some in-
stances of the application of industrial policies since
1974, especially in the forestry sector. Moreover, be-
fore 1974 past developments and the policies applied
had already created the necessary climate for ade-
quate responses on the supply side.
2. Trade liberalization, exchange rate policy
and interest rates: a chronology
One of the first measures of the military government
after the September 1973 coup was to announce a re-
form of trade policy. Trade policy could indeed have
been justly described as chaotic at that time. The
(simple) average tariff was 94%. There were 57 dif-
ferent tariff rates, ranging from 0% to 220% (plus
tariff surcharges for some goods), many non-tariff
measures (prior import deposits, prohibitions, quotas,
etc.), and a system of multiple exchange rates with
eight values for the dollar, the highest of which was
ten times the lowest value. This very peculiar system
of protection was not due to any development objec-
tive. The disorganization reigning in the period of
the Allende government had led to the stagnation of
manufacturing production, the disappearance of eco-
nomic growth, and severe contraction of the infant
non-traditional export sector (which included a num-
ber of manufactures).
The trade liberalization announced late in 1973
involved the elimination of all non-tariff barriers, the
gradual reduction of customs tariffs and their consol-
idation into three levels (with a maximum rate of
60%), unification of the exchange rate, and a devalu-
ation to compensate for the reduction in the aver-
age tariff. The exchange rate was indeed devalued in
real terms during the 2½ years following the reforms.
In the absence of capital flows, this was the result of
the market forces: the opening-up of the economy
brought with it a flood of imports which caused the
exchange rate to go down (i.e., devalue) sharply (fig-
ure 3).
Various events took place which changed the
course of the reforms. As it proceeded, the trade lib-
eralization programme became more radical. In 1975
the authorities announced a new range of tariff rates,
from 10% to 35%, to be reached gradually by 1978.
At the end of 1977, however, the objective of attain-
ing a tariff rate of 10% for all imports by mid-1979
was set, with monthly tariff reductions.
Furthermore, the prospects of gaining access to
international financial markets changed for the better
in the middle of the decade, and this allowed the au-
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thorities to give exchange policy the objective of re-
ducing inflation (essentially through appreciation of
the real exchange rate). Consequently, as from 1976
limitations on international capital movements were
systematically eliminated.10 At the same time, the
crawling peg exchange rate regime was abandoned
and changes in the nominal exchange rate began to
reflect past inflation with a lag. Finally, a fixed
nominal exchange rate was adopted in mid-1979. As
inflation only went down slowly, considerable appre-
ciation of the peso took place between 1976 and
1981, furthered of course by the heavy inflows of
capital. The appreciation in the real exchange rate,
together with the liberalization of imports, was a
negative disturbance for the whole of the tradeables
sector. Instead of setting about the reconversion and
orientation of their activities towards international
markets, the tradeables sectors of the economy
shrank, while the non-tradeables sectors expanded.
The way in which the local financial markets
were liberalized was also an important factor in the
meagre initial results of the trade liberalization
programme. Before the 1973 coup, the domestic fi-
nancial markets were marked by extreme financial
repression: the banks had been nationalized; ceilings
had been placed on interest rates which had no rela-
tion to domestic inflation, resulting in highly nega-
tive real interest rates and the decline of financial
intermediation; and the monetary authorities inter-
vened very strongly in the allocation of credit, with a
proliferation of special credit lines which, taken to-
gether, bore no resemblance to an industrial policy.
The 1975 reforms included the privatization of
banks, the elimination of the ceilings on interest
rates, reduction of the compulsory reserve require-
ments applicable to banks, and the elimination of all
restrictions on credit. At the same time, in an effort
to promote competition, the barriers to entry into
banking and financial activities were markedly re-
duced. There was no prudential regulation of the ac-
tivities of banks or other financial institutions: the
reformers were not moved to caution by any consid-
erations of moral hazard in banking and financial ac-
tivities. As a result, the financial sector grew
enormously, financial operations took the place of
real investments, and interest rates soared from
highly negative levels to levels which were ex-
tremely high in real terms (figure 4).11 In these cir-
cumstances, the readaptation of firms producing for
the domestic market, or their transformation into ex-
port enterprises, was virtually impossible.
As the inflows of foreign capital dried up and
the domestic crisis rapidly began to get worse, in
mid-1983 the single tariff was raised to 20%, and in
September 1984 it was raised again to 35% (the con-
solidated level that Chile had registered in 1979, at
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FIGURE 3
Chile: Real exchange rate and customs tariffs,
1960-1995
(Exchange rate, 1988=100; tariffs in %)
Source: Calculations by the author, based on Central Bank of
Chile, 1989 and various other years, and De la Cuadra and
Hachette, 1992.
10 Ironically, this process concluded in 1981, shortly before the
beginning of the debt crisis, with complete freedom of interna-
tional capital flows.
11 In his last published article, Díaz-Alejandro (1985) gives a
masterly description and makes devastating criticisms of the
Chilean financial liberalization process.
FIGURE 4
Chile: Real interest rates, 1960-1995
(Percentages)
Source: Calculations by the author, based on Central Bank of
Chile, 1989 and various other years.
the end of the Tokyo Round of the GATT multilateral
trade negotiations). Tariff surcharges were imposed
on automobiles and consumer electronic goods.
When the crisis waned, the single tariff was once
again gradually reduced as from 1985. In 1989, at
the end of the military regime, it had stabilized at
15%, from which it was reduced to 11% by the new
democratic government in 1991. During the 1980s,
some policies were adopted to favour export growth:
tariff drawbacks for exporters, a subsidy for new ex-
ports, and foreign direct investment policies which
ultimately favoured non-mining exports. In addition,
thanks to rigorous prudential regulation of financial
institutions, interest rates settled down at more rea-
sonable levels in real terms, favouring investment
and the acquisition of technology. Last but not least,
a persistent shortage of foreign exchange was re-
flected in a series of real devaluations between 1982
and 1988.
Figure 3 provides some information on the evo-
lution of the real exchange rate and average tariffs.12
Broadly speaking, the relation between the real ex-
change rate and the average tariff (a crude but proba-
bly accurate indicator of trade policy for the period
before 1979) behaves as might be expected: the
much lower tariffs since the mid-1970s have been ac-
companied by higher real exchange rates. As the the-
ory would predict, this relation is sustained in the
long term. Between 1976 and 1981, however, the
dramatic tariff reductions were accompanied with a
sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate.
During the 1990s, up to the end of 1997, the
Chilean economy again enjoyed an abundant inflow
of foreign capital. This time, the management of the
capital account was more flexible than in the period
of abundance in the 1980s. The authorities responded
to the growing inflow of external capital by taking
measures to discourage the inflow of short-term capi-
tal while keeping the doors wide open for foreign di-
rect investment (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis, 1997).
In essence, this was done by imposing a 30%
non-interest-bearing compulsory reserve requirement
(to be maintained for one year, regardless of the term
of the financial instrument involved) on loans or fi-
nancial investment from abroad (including invest-
ments on the Chilean stock market). This system is
very costly for short-term flows but has only a low
cost for those with a time horizon of more than one
year. Although this system was effective in reducing
short-term credits and inflows between 1993 and
1995, in 1996 and 1997 capital inflows were never-
theless very large, essentially because of Chile’s high
rating on international financial markets. Conse-
quently, with the policy instruments used the authori-
ties were unable to prevent considerable appreciation
of the exchange rate which once again imperilled the
export-oriented development strategy. Indeed, since
1995 the volumes of non-mining exports have been
growing much more slowly than before.13 In propor-
tion as the inflow of foreign capital has been declin-
ing due to the international financial crisis, the
tendency towards appreciation has been checked.
The lesson to be drawn from recent experience is
clear, however: if greater stability of the real ex-
change rate is desired, it is essential to manage capi-
tal flows more energetically.
3. Explaining the growth of manufactured
exports: an econometric model
Perhaps the most important feature in the success
story of Chilean exports is the appearance of a diver-
sified group of manufactures for export covering a
wide variety of products, most of them easy to manu-
facture or making intensive use of natural resources.
And it is this group of products (through their subse-
quent growth and ongoing diversification) which
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12 The real exchange rate is calculated as the nominal price of
the U.S. dollar, deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) and
multiplied by an index of external prices significant for the
Chilean economy calculated by the Central Bank. The Central
Bank series was used for the period from 1977 on. For previous
periods, we constructed our own series using an external price
index calculated by Ffrench-Davis (1984). Our figures for the
1974-1976 period correct the official under-estimation of the
CPI growth rate. With regard to average tariffs, from 1974 on
the series is a simple average. As there were no non-tariff barri-
ers after 1975, the average tariff is a fairly exact reflection of
the restrictiveness of the trade regime. No data are available for
the period before 1973, which was marked by high tariffs, con-
siderable dispersion of tariff rates, and numerous non-tariff re-
strictions. We used a trade liberalization index developed by De
la Cuadra and Hachette (1992, p. 79) and applied the quotient of
that index at its 1980 value to the average tariff for that year
(10%) in order to obtain the tariff rate equivalent to all the trade
restrictions in the period from 1960 to 1973. The use of the
1980 tariff is justified by the fact that that was the first full year
of application of the 10% unified tariff.
13 This is exactly what might have been predicted using our ec-
onometric analysis of manufactured exports (see the following
section).
holds out the greatest hope for future growth of ex-
ports and of the economy as a whole. It would there-
fore be very interesting to identify the factors
explaining the growth of such exports.
Two studies have been made on the behaviour of
Chilean exports in the past. Through a partial adjust-
ment analysis, De Gregorio (1984) estimated the
supply functions for non-copper exports, finding sta-
tistically significant price-elasticities for export sup-
ply. Using an error correction model, Moguillansky
and Titelman (1993) estimated supply functions for
various categories of non-copper exports. They con-
cluded that the long-term price elasticities are consis-
tently higher than the short-term elasticities (and that
both are statistically significant). In their supply
functions for exports of manufactures, tariffs (which
were incorporated as an additional explanatory vari-
able) proved to be negatively associated with such
exports. Moguillansky and Titelman used a more ad-
vanced econometric technique than De Gregorio, but
they did not include a variable for idle capacity, al-
though in the context in question recession and idle
capacity played a dominant role in setting off the
process of export growth in the mid-1970s.
Like these authors, we analysed the role of vari-
ous factors in the framework of a supply function:
tariff reduction, real exchange rate devaluation, and
idle capacity. Using the “small country” assumption,
which is appropriate in the case of Chile, it can be
safely posited that the manufactured exports of that
country do not affect the prices of such goods on the
world market, so that we can ignore possible feed-
back effects by export volumes on international
prices.
In this exercise, exports of manufactures (XM)
are a function of the real price of manufactures for
the export market (PM, defined as the price index for
manufactures, in dollars, multiplied by the nominal
exchange rate for the dollar and deflated by nominal
wages in manufacturing); the simple average tariff
(TR), and an index of idle capacity in manufacturing
(EX, defined as the percentage by which potential
manufacturing output, calculated by linearly joining
the procyclical values, exceeds observed output).14
The basic idea of the model is that there are two
groups of manufactures: i) products which are manu-
factured for the domestic market but which could be
exported in certain circumstances, and whose rela-
tive price is the tariff rate, and ii) goods produced
primarily for export markets because of the narrow-
ness of domestic markets. The relative price of these
goods is expressed in terms of non-tradeables, for
which the proxy used here is the nominal wage level.
All the variables except idle capacity are expressed
as logarithms.
According to the augmented Dickey-Fuller
statigraph, the logarithm for exports of manufactures
(ln XM) and the logarithm for the average tariff
(ln TR) were stationary variables with deterministic
tendencies. The rest of the variables (ln EX, ln PM)
were also stationary, but without tendencies (see
table 3). We thus proceeded to explain variations in
ln XM by the following set of variables: a time
trend (to incorporate the deterministic tendency in
two variables, ln XM and ln TR), ln TR, ln PM, and
ln EX. The results are shown in table 5.
In table 5 we give two equations, one with the
price variable and the other without it. The first equa-
tion, which includes all the variables of interest to us,
has an autocorrelation problem which it was impos-
sible to eliminate. For this reason, we included the
second equation, in which we eliminated the price
variable and added two lags in the dependent vari-
able. This gives an equation with well-behaved resi-
dues. The reason why two lags are needed for the
dependent variable is the high degree of persistence
in the volume of exports of manufactures. The two
equations show us that reductions in tariffs, increases
in the relative prices of manufactures on export mar-
kets, and idle capacity give rise to positive changes
in the supply function for exports of manufactures
but do not affect the trend of the growth rate of such
exports.
The two long-term equations are obtained by
equalling the lagged and current values of the vari-
ables.
ln XM = 2.888 + 0.093t - 0.679 ln TR +
·0.854 ln PM
-1 + 0.064 ln EX (6)
ln XM = 6.52 + 0.097t - 0.598 ln TR +
0.032 ln EX (7)
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14 We also tried another definition of idle capacity: the differ-
ence between the value added in manufacturing, smoothed with
a Hodrik-Prescott filter, and real manufacturing output. How-
ever, the results obtained with this more sophisticated method
were identical to those obtained with the less refined definition
of the idle capacity variable.
These equations are reasonably similar. We used
the first of them to determine approximate orders of
magnitude of the effects that changes in the explana-
tory variables (tariff reductions, idle capacity and ex-
change rate devaluation) have on the growth of
exports of manufactures. The results, which should
be considered as purely illustrative, were as follows:
• Idle capacity in the 1970s: between 1973 and
1975 idle capacity rose from 8% to 46%. This
added 8% to the annual growth rate of exports of
manufactures, giving a total of 18% for the pe-
riod as a whole.
• Idle capacity in the 1980s: between 1981 and
1985 idle capacity in manufacturing rose from
close to zero to 23%. This contributed 7½ per-
centage points to the annual growth rate of ex-
ports of manufactures (34% over the whole
period).
• Trade liberalization in 1974-1979, with ex-
change rate appreciation in 1975-1982: tariffs
went down from close to 100% in 1974 to 10%
in early 1979. As a result, exports of manufac-
tures grew for this reason alone by 205% (25%
per year). This positive effect on export growth
was partly reversed by the adverse effect of ex-
change rate appreciation, however: between
1976 and 1982 the ratio between manufacturing
export prices and wages in manufacturing
went down by 75%, causing a 69% drop in
the volume of manufactured exports (nearly
15% per year).
• Exchange rate devaluation in 1982-1988: the
real price of exports of manufactures (as defined
earlier) went up by 118% during this period,
causing exports of manufactures to rise by 96%
(11.6% per year).
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TABLE 5
Explanation of variations in exports of manufactures, 1960-1995
(Dependent variable: ln XM)
Explanatory Equation (1) t values Equation (2) t values
variable Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 1.268 1.07 5.191 5.84a
Trend 0.041 3.04a 0.077 5.98a
ln TR -0.298 -2.43b -0.476 -4.32a
ln PM(-1) 0.375 3.57a
ln EX 0.028 2.17b 0.026 2.20b
ln XM(-1) 0.561 4.23a 0.781 5.85a
ln XM(-2) -0.577 -4.92a
Adjusted R2 0.976 0.981
Breusch-Godfrey F
statistic
0.019 [0.019]b 0.108 [0.898]
Normality (Jarque-Berg) a 2.769 [0.250] 1.999 [0.368]
Heterocedasticity (Xi
2) 0.847 [0.591] 0.471 [0.892]
Heterocedasticity (Xi*Xi) 0.841 [0.647] 1.031 [0.490]
a Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
IV
Other policies that affect
export growth
In addition to trade liberalization and exchange rate
policies, there are other policies which have also
aided in the rapid growth of Chile’s non-copper ex-
ports. These policies may be classified in two main
groups: general policies affecting all exports (hori-
zontal policies) and sectoral policies and factors.
1. Horizontal policies
a) Drawback systems
Two drawback systems have been used since the
mid-1980s. One is a conventional system, in use
since 1988, whereby the import duty on inputs used
for the manufacture of exports is recovered after the
exports are sold. This programme suffers from cer-
tain weaknesses. It involves a good deal of paper-
work and financial costs for the entrepreneur, since
he first has to pay the import duty and only recovers
it after a considerable delay. The other system, intro-
duced in 1985, is termed “simplified drawback”. For
exports of less than US$ 20 million, in a given tariff
item, all exporters receive a cash subsidy of 3, 5 or
10% (depending on the value of exports for the
whole tariff item) of the value of the exports, instead
of the regular drawback. Although this system has
been presented as an effort to simplify formalities for
small exporters, for whom the regular drawback sys-
tem is a costly process, it does in fact contain an ele-
ment of subsidy estimated to amount to a maximum
of around 6% for the drawback rate of 10% (applied
to exports with a value of less than US$ 10 million
for the whole tariff item).15
This system has become increasingly important
as an export incentive. In 1994 the State paid out a
total of US$ 150 million in respect of simplified
drawback and only US$ 26 million under the regular
drawback system. Approximately 13% of the total
value of exports (and 70% of the number of products
exported) obtained simplified drawback in that year
(Ffrench-Davis and Sáez, 1995, pp. 79 and 89).
Although no detailed econometric studies have
been made of the impact of simplified drawback on
the appearance of new exports, it cannot be a mere
coincidence that since the introduction of that system
the number and value of manufactured products ex-
ported have grown rapidly. Indeed, this type of in-
centive is close to being economically optimal: new
exports undoubtedly have strong externalities con-
nected with the corresponding stock of information,
and when the exports of a good grow, these externali-
ties disappear. Thus, the automatic extinction of the
element of subsidy is a particularly attractive feature
of this system.
Furthermore, importers of capital goods pay tar-
iffs for terms of up to seven years, but exporters are
exempted from these payments, and this undoubtedly
stimulates investment in export activities. Both this
measure and that providing for simplified drawback
are considered as subsidies by the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) and will have to be eliminated by the
end of 2002.
b) Policies on foreign direct investment
Policies on foreign direct investment have
played both a direct and an indirect role in stimulat-
ing exports. The regulations in this respect were
completely liberalized in 1974 (see Riveros, Vatter
and Agosin, 1996), and although foreign direct in-
vestment did not increase until 1987 it has grown
steadily since then. Around 60% of all new invest-
ments under the regular system have gone to the
mining sector, in which Chile has clear comparative
advantages.
Other foreign direct investment policies have
resulted in the stimulation of non-mining exports.
In 1985 the authorities instituted a debt-equity
swap programme designed to reduce the external
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15 With the present across-the-board 11% tariff, the 10% “sim-
plified drawback” would not represent a subsidy if the imported
inputs accounted for 90% of the value of the final exports. The
real value of such inputs is probably around 30-40% of the total
price.
debt burden while at the same time promoting for-
eign direct investment. However, this channel for in-
vesting in Chile was neither as neutral nor as
automatic as the regular foreign direct investment
system. As Ffrench-Davis (1990) noted, although the
debt-equity swap programme represented a heavy
subsidy for foreign direct investment, the projects
had to be approved on a case-by-case basis, with pri-
ority being given to new exports. Thus, the authori-
ties made a virtue out of necessity and applied an
industrial policy under another name. During the pe-
riod in which this programme was in operation
(1985-1991), nearly 60% of the investments made
under it went to manufacturing and agriculture,
mainly to the forestry and pulp and paper sectors.
Around 40% of all foreign direct investment during
this period was made through debt-equity swaps.
c) Information on foreign markets
As already noted, collecting information on for-
eign markets is an expensive business in which the
social yield is much higher than the private benefits
obtained. Since 1974, the Chilean government has
made significant investments in this activity. With
the aid of 32 trade offices abroad, a trade promotion
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(“ProChile”) has been carrying out market studies
and collecting trade information of interest to export-
ers. It recently launched an aggressive campaign to
create a positive image of the country and is on the
point of being transformed into an autonomous
semi-public corporation with substantial private sec-
tor participation. During the 1990s there has been a
further increase in officially subsidized trade promo-
tion activities. Firms have been encouraged to group
together in associations to promote their products
and carry out joint activities to gain a better knowl-
edge of their markets. The overseas activities and
management costs of these Export Committees are
subsidized on a decreasing scale for a maximum of
six years.
d) Technological development
The problem of the shortfall in investment in
technological development has been handled in an
ingenious manner. Fundación Chile –a profit-making
institution which has nevertheless (so far) enjoyed a
government subsidy and whose equity belongs in
equal shares to the Chilean State and ITT –16 has de-
veloped appropriate new technologies for export
products and has launched new firms which were
subsequently sold to the private sector. Like any
other venture capital organization, it has had plenty
of failures, but it has also had some notable suc-
cesses, especially the development of the salmon ex-
port industry. Promotion of applied research in the
broadest sense (including the development of new
products for export markets) is an important compo-
nent in a comprehensive export promotion effort, and
there are grounds for maintaining that the sustained
growth and diversification of exports in the future
will require the allocation of much greater resources
for applied research and that the combined efforts of
the private sector, the government and institutions
like Fundación Chile will continue to be absolutely
insufficient.
e) Development of infrastructure and human re-
sources
Chile’s infrastructure in terms of roads, ports,
airports, tunnels, etc. is currently a serious bottleneck
hampering the further intensification of its process of
export-led growth, but in the mid-1970s the fact that
it had an adequate infrastructure by the standards of
the time was undoubtedly an important element
which facilitated the rapid growth of its exports. In
other words, without the infrastructure which already
existed at that time (several large ports, an interna-
tional airport inaugurated as recently as 1967, and a
North-South highway completed in the 1960s,
largely with external aid) the mere changes in the
price signals would have elicited a much feebler re-
sponse on the part of supply.
Furthermore, the human resources available at
the time were appropriate for the task of reorienting
the economy towards export markets. In the early
1970s, Chile had a large number of engineers and
managers trained in public (or State-aided) universi-
ties in previous decades. The period of import substi-
tution and the active entrepreneurial spirit displayed
by the State since the 1940s had also left a legacy of
industrial and management professionals who could
serve the export effort. For example, the universities
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16 The story of the creation of Fundación Chile is quite interest-
ing. When the military government had to compensate ITT for
the nationalization of the Chilean Telephone Company, it was
agreed to set up the Fundación Chile, with the government pay-
ing ITT’s share.
had already begun to turn out graduate forestry engi-
neers in the 1950s, and in the 1960s there were major
programmes for creating specific human capital for
the agricultural sector, which later proved crucial for
the development of fruit and vegetable exports. In
1964 a semi-autonomous agricultural research insti-
tute (INIA) had been set up with public funds, and in
1965 a ten-year programme was established between
the University of Chile (the country’s main public
university) and the University of California at Davis
to train Chilean agronomists. This relationship be-
came an important means of transfer of technology
between two regions with similar climatic and soil
conditions (Meller, 1994).
2. Sectoral policies
Important sectoral policies have also been applied
and there have been special factors which have had a
direct influence on the expansion of particular export
products. Some of these are described below.
a) The forestry conglomerate
The forestry conglomerate has made an impor-
tant contribution to export growth (roundwood,
chips, lumber, paper and pulp, and more recently,
furniture). At 1995 prices, exports of this group of
industries increased by a factor of 17 between 1973
and 1995, rising from US$ 105 million to US$ 1.8
billion. In spite of the advantages of this natural re-
source-based sector in Chile, an industrial policy was
needed to provide the “big push” that would make it
into an important industry. This is perhaps the only
example since 1974 of a large-scale and undoubtedly
very successful industrial policy. It included special
incentives for the development of the sector and a le-
gal framework favourable to private enterprise and
exports which did away with liquidity restrictions on
investment and furthered the accumulation of spe-
cific human capital in the sector.
Public afforestation and reafforestation program-
mes go back to the 1960s. In 1974 a subsidy of 75%
of the cost of planting trees was introduced (De-
cree-Law 701). At the same time, privately planted
land was declared inexpropriable, the ban on cutting
down trees less than 18 years old was eliminated,
and the export of unworked timber was authorized.
These changes in the law made vertical integration
possible and highly profitable (see Rossi, 1995). In
addition, between 1975 and 1979 the Central Bank
granted the private commercial banks and the Banco
del Estado (a public commercial bank set up to at-
tend to the needs of small depositors and entrepre-
neurs) a special credit line for financing forestry
development projects, with particularly favourable
conditions for natural persons and small enterprises.
It had long been known that Chile has compara-
tive advantages in forestry activities. The weather
and soil conditions ensure rapid growth of certain
species, especially Monterey Pine. In view of this
natural resource endowment, in the 1950s the Uni-
versity of Chile (a public institution) and the Catho-
lic University (which received heavy State subsidies)
began to offer courses leading to a degree in forestry,
so that, when the sector began to develop, the indus-
try already had a significant corps of specialists in
this field. When conditions became favourable, quite
a number of these professionals became forestry and
lumbering entrepreneurs. Since then, the courses for
degrees in forestry have further increased in the pub-
lic universities and have also begun to be offered in
many private universities.
b) The salmon-farming industry
Exports of industrially raised salmon, which
were insignificant in 1986, amounted to some
US$ 700 million in 1998. Chile now supplies nearly
15% of the world output of industrially raised
salmon and trout and is currently the second biggest
exporter in the world after Norway. The salmon
industry is a real success story in which the adapta-
tion and development of technology played a leading
role.
Fundación Chile began to experiment with the
industrial raising of salmon in the second half of the
1970s. In the early 1980s it organized an enterprise
to raise salmon in Lake Llanquihue using floating
cages: a technique developed in Norway and Scot-
land which, it was considered, could be well adapted
to the natural conditions of the Chilean “Lake Dis-
trict”. This enterprise, Salmones Antártica, was later
sold to Nippon Suisan, a Japanese firm which is one
of the biggest fishery corporations in the world. The
example of Salmones Antártica attracted many more
investments by local and foreign firms (Achurra,
1995).
This industry is very interesting for a number of
reasons. One is that it combines technological
change induced by a semi-public institution with the
natural advantages of the country. Secondly, salmon
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exports represent the exploitation of an export niche.
Their success shows that it is not necessary to follow
the Asian model of penetrating mass markets with
consumer goods in which the main comparative ad-
vantage of a developing country is low wages. Such
sectors are very vulnerable to protectionism, and
other approaches may now be much more profitable.
Finally, the salmon industry has many positive back-
ward linkages. Thus, it has given a boost to local in-
dustries producing floating cages, salmon feed,
fishing nets, packing materials and transport ser-
vices. Since it employs highly qualified professionals
(engineers, aquaculture technicians, biologists) it has
also had a beneficial impact on the demand for con-
struction services, education and retail trade in the
region.
c) Wine
Chilean wine exports have registered a meteoric
rise over the last ten years or so, from US$ 10 mil-
lion in 1985 to around US$ 550 million in 1998.
Winemaking is a traditional economic activity in
Chile, going back to colonial times. However, the
types of wine produced by Chilean winemakers up to
the mid-1980s were not to the taste of consumers in
the developed countries: big changes in technology
were needed to enable Chilean wines to be sold on a
large scale abroad. These changes included the intro-
duction of stainless steel vats, the use of small casks
made of new wood instead of the large old barrels
previously used for ageing the wine, and investments
in new refrigeration plant and equipment for grinding
and pressing the grapes. Although it was known that
Chilean wines could be produced more advanta-
geously with the new technologies used in Europe
and the United States, a demonstration effect was
needed. In 1981 the Spanish winemaking firm
Miguel Torres bought extensive areas of land near
Curicó in the Central Valley and began to produce
wine using the new technologies, and its success led
to the rapid adoption of the new methods by Chilean
firms.
The opening up of the economy made it easier to
import new machinery. Furthermore, many of the tra-
ditional Chilean wine producers are large firms com-
pared with European winemakers and also operate in
other export sectors (particularly fruit exports), so
they do not suffer from liquidity constraints which
restrict their investments. More recently, investments
have also been made by other large firms from
Europe and the United States, such as Rothschild,
Larose Trintaudon, Grand Marnier, Roberto Mondavi
and The Christian Brothers. Furthermore, a number
of small specialized winemakers are bringing out
new products for the export market and are seeking
to sell wines of higher prices and quality than those
offered by the traditional winemaking firms. These
producers, who have less capital than the big
winemakers and the foreign investors, rely on the as-
sociations of new wine producers to sell their prod-
ucts abroad (Bordeu, 1995). The marketing services
offered by ProChile and the new joint export
programmes mentioned earlier have also been ac-
tively used by the smaller producers.
d) The motor industry
Automobile parts have been a small but signifi-
cant component of exports of manufactures for over
a decade. They have been stimulated by the only per-
formance requirement still in force in Chilean invest-
ment policy. A special programme called the
Automotive Statute allows assembly firms to import
CKD or SKD 17 kits tariff-free provided such imports
are covered by exports of domestically produced
components with the same value. The Statute also
gives assembly firms tax credits for components pro-
duced domestically or exported. In order to be eligi-
ble for such credits, a component must have at least
70% of local added value if it is for domestic use, or
50% if it is for export. These incentives are not com-
patible with the Trade-Related Investment Measures
of the World Trade Organization and will have to be
eliminated by the end of 1999. In fact, the tax credits
expired at the end of 1998.
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17 Completely knocked down (CKD) and semi knocked down
(SKD) are terms used in the automobile assembly industry and
refer to kits of parts without any degree of assembly in the first




There can be little doubt that the expansion and di-
versification of exports, which began in the
mid-1970s but took on a decisive role in develop-
ment as from the mid-1980s, has been the main driv-
ing force in the growth of the Chilean economy. The
next stage of export-oriented development will be
much more difficult, however. The easy stage of ex-
port promotion is now over, and it is unlikely that
continuing with the recipe as before will allow the
high growth rates of exports and of the GDP to be
maintained. Firstly, Chile will have to abandon some
policy instruments which have been very profitable
in the past (the simplified drawback system,
duty-free imports of capital goods for exporters and
the Automotive Statute, for example). Secondly, be-
coming internationally competitive in more sophisti-
cated goods involves more complex requirements
than those demanded by the export of primary com-
modities or the like, ranging from human resources
development, improved business capabilities, the ac-
quisition of information and greater applied research
efforts by local firms to improvements in the coun-
try’s ports, highways and tunnels. This will require a
more active –and efficient– State than in the past.
In order to further heighten export-oriented
growth it will also be necessary to give up the dog-
matic insistence on a uniform tariff and take a more
aggressive attitude to tariff reduction. There is no
reason to keep tariffs on capital goods and the wide
range of intermediate goods that are not produced
within the country. Export-oriented growth requires
a zero tariff for these goods, particularly in the light
of the restrictions that Chile will soon be facing on
measures designed to compensate for the distortions
caused by the tariffs applied to such goods.
Progressing with the export-oriented growth
model also calls for better access to markets. The po-
tential that intra-Latin American trade has for Chile,
as an exporter of light manufactures and agroindus-
trial goods and an importer of foodstuffs, makes
MERCOSUR a strategically important trading partner.
Foreign direct investment policy can be used to
attract investments. While maintaining a liberal atti-
tude to foreign direct investment, the Chilean author-
ities should make a bigger effort to attract transna-
tional corporations with desirable technological or
management assets and with access to markets for
manufactures. Association with MERCOSUR could be
important for attracting such corporations to the
manufacturing sector, where they have so far been
conspicuous by their absence.
Finally, Chile will have to reinvent development
banks. Such banks should provide long-term credit at
market interest rates to firms which have good export
projects but, in most cases, do not have access to pri-
vate capital markets. They could also be used to
channel funds towards loans for higher and technical
education and for financing expenditure on applied
research. Development banks do not need to inter-
vene directly in the provision of loans for firms or in-
dividuals: they can function as second-tier banks,
making credit lines available to private financial in-
stitutions for specific purposes. They can also act as
intermediaries between the international financial
markets and small and medium-sized firms whose
activities are in keeping with the development strat-
egy but who do not have access to such resources. It
is also important that development banks should en-
sure that pre- and post-shipment credit is available to
the export sector at internationally competitive rates.
This is the most efficient way of supporting in-
fant industries, and moreover it is not prohibited by
the rules of the World Trade Organization. It could in
fact become the main instrument for promoting spe-
cific sectors and activities. Carlos Díaz-Alejandro
(1985, pp. 20-21), in a far-sighted article published
after his death, said that the experience of Latin
America, and also that of continental Europe in the
last century, arouses some skepticism about whether
the private markets, unaided, will generate financial
intermediation flows big enough to support a long-term
capital formation rate sufficient to take full advantage
of the high social yields available from long-term in-
vestments. By providing long-term credit for new,
non-traditional activities, development banks would do
away with one of the arguments often adduced to jus-
tify exaggerated protection against imports.
(Original: Spanish)
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APPENDIX 1
Derivation of the production function to be estimated
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Let us assume that the “real” production function has the following form:
Y
t
= α0 + α1 Kt + α2 Xt + ut (1)
where Y is the global product, K is the capital stock, X is total exports and u is an error factor with the usual
properties.








(1 − λ) I
t–1 (2)
where λ is the rate of depreciation.
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Multiplying the terms by the denominator of the I
t
coefficient, (3) can be expressed as:
Y
t
– (1 – λ)Y
t-1 = α0 + α1 (1 – λ)It-1 + α2 [Xt – (1 – λ)Xt-1] + ut – (1 – λ)ut-1 (4)
As in the long-term equilibrium all the lagged values of the variables are equal to their current values,
(4) is reduced to:
Y
t
= β0 + β1It + β2 Xt + ut (5)
where
β0 = α0 / λ;
β1 = α1(1 – λ) / λ;
β2 = α2
Bibliography
Achurra, M. (1995): La experiencia de un nuevo producto
de exportación: los salmones, in P. Meller and R. E.
Sáez (eds.), Auge exportador chileno: lecciones y
desafíos futuros, Santiago, Chile, Economic Re-
search Corporation for Latin America (CIEPLAN)/
Dolmen Editores.
Agosin, M. R. and R. Ffrench-Davis (1995): Trade liber-
alization and growth: Recent experiences in Latin
America, Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs, vol. 37, No. 3, Miami, Florida, Uni-
versity of Miami, Institute of Interamerican Studies.
(1997): Managing capital inflows in Chile, Estudios
de economía, vol. 24, No. 2, Santiago, Chile, Univer-
sity of Chile, Department of Economics.
Akyüz, Y. and C. Gore (1996): The investment-profits
nexus in East Asian industrialization, World Devel-
opment, vol. 24, No. 3, Oxford, U.K., Pergamon
Press, Ltd.
Amsden, A. H. (1993): Trade policy and economic per-
formance in Korea, in M. R. Agosin and D. Tussie
(eds.), Trade and Growth. New Dilemmas in Trade
Policy, New York, St. Martin’s Press.
(1994): Why isn’t the whole world experimenting
with the East Asian model to develop?: Review of
the East Asian Miracle, World Development, vol. 22,
No. 4, Oxford, U.K., Pergamon Press, Ltd.
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995): Economic
Growth, New York, McGraw-Hill.
TRADE AND GROWTH IN CHILE • MANUEL R. AGOSIN
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 8 • A U G U S T 1 9 9 9 99
APPENDIX 2
Derivation of the compensatory devaluation
Let us assume that, to begin with, the economy has its balance of payments in equilibrium. If we make F*
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where the asterisks denote international prices (assumed to be independent of the country’s levels of trade).








Under the small-country assumption, the prices of importable and exportable goods are, respectively:
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where t is the tariff (ad valorem) and e is the nominal exchange rate (pesos per dollar).



















where a circumflex over a variable denotes a percentage change.
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where h is the quotient between the value of exports and the value of imports expressed in foreign currency in
the initial period before trade liberalization.
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